104 research outputs found
On the Classic Protocol for MPC Schnorr Signatures
In this paper, we prove that the classic three-round protocol for MPC Schnorr Signatures is fully-adaptive UC-secure. Furthermore, we show that a simple variant of the Classic protocol achieves tight security, i.e.~the security of the resulting, modified, protocol tightly reduces to the security of the underlying non-MPC scheme
On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that:
1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)].
2) BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1-Theta(1).
3) For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI).
The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS\u2717) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability
Practical Key-Extraction Attacks in Leading MPC Wallets
Multi-Party Computation (MPC) has become a major tool for protecting hundreds of billions of dollars in cryptocurrency wallets. MPC protocols are currently powering the wallets of Coinbase, Binance, Zengo, BitGo, Fireblocks and many other fintech companies servicing thousands of financial institutions and hundreds of millions of end-user consumers.
We present four novel key-extraction attacks on popular MPC signing protocols showing how a single corrupted party may extract the secret in full during the MPC signing process. Our attacks are highly practical (the practicality of the attack depends on the number of signature-generation ceremonies the attacker participates in before extracting the key). Namely, we show key-extraction attacks against different threshold-ECDSA protocols/implementations requiring , , , and *one signature*, respectively. In addition, we provide proof-of-concept code that implements our attacks
UC Non-Interactive, Proactive, Threshold ECDSA
Building on the Gennaro & Goldfeder and Lindell & Nof protocols (CCS ’18), we present a threshold ECDSA protocol, for any number of signatories and any threshold, that improves as follows over the state of the art:
* Signature generation takes only 4 rounds (down from the current 8 rounds), with a comparable computational cost. Furthermore, 3 of these rounds can take place in a preprocessing stage before the signed message is known, lending to a non-interactive threshold ECDSA protocol.
* The protocol withstands adaptive corruption of signatories. Furthermore, it includes a periodic refresh mechanism and offers full proactive security.
* The protocol realizes an ideal threshold signature functionality within the UC framework, in the global random oracle model, assuming Strong RSA, semantic security of the Paillier encryption, and a somewhat enhanced variant of existential unforgeability of ECDSA.
These properties (low latency, compatibility with cold-wallet architectures, proactive security, and composable security) make the protocol ideal for threshold wallets for ECDSA-based cryptocurrencies
On the Complexity of Fair Coin Flipping
A two-party coin-flipping protocol is -fair if no efficient adversary can bias the output of the honest party (who always outputs a bit, even if the other party aborts) by more than . Cleve [STOC \u2786] showed that -round -fair coin-flipping protocols do not exist. Awerbuch et al. [Manuscript \u2785] constructed a -fair coin-flipping protocol, assuming the existence of one-way functions. Moran et al. [Journal of Cryptology \u2716] constructed an -round coin-flipping protocol that is -fair (thus matching the aforementioned lower bound of Cleve [STOC \u2786]), assuming the existence of oblivious transfer.
The above gives rise to the intriguing question of whether oblivious transfer, or more generally ``public-key primitives\u27\u27, is required for an -fair coin flipping. This question was partially answered by Dachman-Soled et al. [TCC \u2711] and Dachman-Soled et al. [TCC \u2714], who showed that restricted types of fully black-box reductions cannot establish -fair coin-flipping protocols from one-way functions. In particular, for constant-round coin-flipping protocols, Dachman-Soled et al. showed that black-box techniques from one-way functions can only guarantee fairness of order .
We make progress towards answering the above question by showing that, for any constant , the existence of an -fair, -round coin-flipping protocol implies the existence of an infinitely-often key-agreement protocol, where denotes some universal constant (independent of ).
Our reduction is non black-box and makes a novel use of the recent dichotomy for two-party protocols of Haitner et al. [FOCS \u2718] to facilitate a two-party variant of the recent attack of Beimel et al. [FOCS \u2718] on multi-party coin-flipping protocols
Efficient Asymmetric Threshold ECDSA for MPC-based Cold Storage
Motivated by applications to cold-storage solutions for ECDSA-based cryptocurrencies, we present a new threshold ECDSA protocol between ``online\u27\u27 parties and a single ``offline\u27\u27 (aka.~cold) party. The primary objective of this protocol is to minimize the exposure of the offline party in terms of connected time and bandwidth. This is achieved through a unique asymmetric signing phase, in which the majority of computation, communication, and interaction is handled by the online parties.
Our protocol supports a very efficient non-interactive pre-signing stage; the parties calculate preprocessed data for future signatures where each party (offline or online) sends a single independently-generated short message per future signature. Then, to calculate the signature, the offline party simply receives a single short message (approx.~300B) and outputs the signature. All previous ECDSA protocols either have high exposure for all parties, or rely on non-standard coding assumptions. (We assume strong RSA, DCR, DDH and enhanced unforgeability of ECDSA.)
To achieve the above, we present a new batching technique for proving in zero-knowledge that the plaintexts of practically any number of Paillier ciphertexts all lie in a given range. The cost of the resulting batch proof is very close to that of the non-batch proof for a single ciphertext, and the technique is applicable to arbitrary Schnorr-style protocols
Highly Efficient OT-Based Multiplication Protocols
We present a new OT-based two-party multiplication protocol that is almost as efficient as Gilboa\u27s semi-honest protocol (Crypto \u2799), but has a high-level of security against malicious adversaries without further compilation. The achieved security suffices for many applications, and, assuming DDH, can be cheaply compiled into full security
On Fully Secure MPC with Solitary Output
We study the possibility of achieving full security, with guaranteed output delivery, for secure multiparty computation of functionalities where only one party receives output, to which we refer as solitary functionalities. In the standard setting where all parties receive an output, full security typically requires an honest majority; otherwise even just achieving fairness is impossible. However, for solitary functionalities, fairness is clearly not an issue. This raises the following question: Is full security with no honest majority possible for all solitary functionalities? We give a negative answer to this question, by showing the existence of solitary functionalities that cannot be computed with full security. While such a result cannot be proved using fairness based arguments, our proof builds on the classical proof technique of Cleve (STOC 1986) for ruling out fair coin-tossing and extends it in a nontrivial way. On the positive side, we show that full security against any number of malicious parties is achievable for many natural and useful solitary functionalities, including ones for which the multi-output version cannot be realized with full security
Fairness in two-party computation : characterizing fair functions
Secure two-party computation is a classic problem in cryptography. It involves
two parties computing a function of their private inputs, and only
revealing what the output suggests. Additional security requirements may
include fairness, which states that either all parties receive output, or no
one does. A seminal result from the 1980's demonstrates that fairness cannot
be guaranteed for all functions, and only recently have certain functions
been shown to be computable with fairness. The two results naturally give
rise to a distinction between fair functions and unfair ones. In this work,
we investigate the characterization of such functions in the two-party setting.
In the end, we obtain a full characterization for Boolean functions,
and we develop a number of useful techniques for characterizing arbitrary
fair functions.Secure two-party computation és un problema clà ssic en criptografia. Dos
participants acorden calcular una funció de les seves entrades privades, de
manera que només es revela el que se'n derivi del resultat. Altres requisits de
seguretat poden incloure fairness, que exigeix que o bé tots els participants
obtenen el resultat, o ningú ho fa. Un resultat fonamental de la dècada dels
80 demostra que la propietat no es pot garantir per a totes les funcions, i
només recentment s'ha demostrat que algunes sà que tenen aquesta propietat.
Els dos resultats donen lloc a una distinció entre les funcions que són
fair, i les que no ho són. En aquest treball, investiguem la caracterització
d'aquestes funcions en l'entorn de dos participants, obtenint una caracterització
completa de funcions Booleanes. A més a més, desenvolupem una
sèrie de tècniques útils per caracteritzar qualsevol funció
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